In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:THOMISTIC METAETIDCS AND A PRESENT CONTROVERSY XOOD STARTING point for understanding the recent controversy regarding the Grisez-Finnis interpretaition oi St. Thomas Aquinas's ethical theory is Finnis's claim that "by a 'Simple act of non-inferential understanding one grasps that the objeot of the [natural] inclination which one experiences is an instance of a general form of good, for oneself (and others like one)." 1 For here Finnis is denying an (...) inferential process by which one moves from a theoretical understanding (" understanding this nature from the outside, as it were" 2) of what inclinations humans,as humans have to the conclusion that the object oi the particular inclination in question is ·a human good. Instead, he is asserting that it is in a practical context that one understands an object of an inclination to be a human good, and thus generates, via the practical reason, ·a practical, prescriptive principle. An example of such a principle is " Knowledge is something good to have " which, for Finnis, is the same logically as " Knowledge is a good to be pursued " 3 which, in turn, is equivalent to "Knowledge ought to be pursued ",4 which is a prescriptive ("normative") rather than descriptive (factual) utterance.5 1Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980; hereafter NLNR), p. 34. Cf. Fundamentals of Ethics (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1983; hereafter FE), pp. 20-22. 2NLNR p. 34. s Ibid., p. 63. 4lbid., p. 42, note 56; "The Basic Principles of Natural Law: A Reply to Ralph Mclnerny," John Finnis and Germain Grisez, American Journal of Jurisprudence 26 (1981), pp. 21-31 (hereafter Reply to Mcinerny), pp. 23-24. See also Germain Grisez's well-known article "The First Principle of Practical Reason: A Commentary on the Summa theologiae, 1-2, Question 94, Article 2," Natural Law Forum 10 (1965), pp. 168-201 (hereafter FPPR), p. 194. 5 See, e.g., NLNR, pp. 44-45; Reply to Mcinerny, p. 23. Grisez and Finnis attempt to distinguish imperatives and prescriptions, which I argue against in 40 THOMISTIC METAETHICS AND A PRESENT CONTROVERSY 41 Finnis and Grisez, then, argue that practical principles, which encompass value-judgments about human goods, are arrived at through the practical reason and thus are prescriptive ("normative ") utterances, as opposed to descriptive or theoretical truths "of metaphysical anthropology ".6 Hence these principles cannot be derived from metaphysical claims.7 To argue for such,a derivation would he to hold that prescriptivity or normativity can emerge from pure descriptivity. Such a derivation, of course, would not account for the appearance of the prescriptive or action-guiding element. An alternative position, to be returned to below, is that value-judgments about human goods are descriptive in themselves. At the same time, owing to the natural inclination to do what we understand to be morally or humanly good, human beings could prescribe to themselves the pursuit of such human goods, once they are understood to be human goods. It should be noted that for Grisez and Finnis the basic practical principles are not moral but pre-moraL8 Still, Grisez and Finnis consider that they direct to ends completive of human nature. Hence, although these authors reserve the characterization of "' moraily right choices " to those that are not simply harmonious with one or another basic human good but rather to those that also do not run counter to any other human good,9 my paper "Is-Ought: Prescribing and a P1·esent Controversy," The Thomist 49, l (January, 1985), pp. 1-23 (hereafter Schultz), esp. pp. 10-Hl. s Reply to Mcinerny, pp. 23-24. 7 Ibid.; see note 13 below. In the paper mentioned in note 5 above I point out that Finnis seems to allow for the possibility of arriving at value-judgments through theoretical reasoning, since he says "I assert that judgments [about man's natural goods, about what man should be] are primarily (though perhaps not exclitsively) judgments of practical reason...." ("Natural Law and 'Is'-'Ought' Question: An Invitation to Professor Veatch," Catholic Lawyer 26, 4, 1981, p. 272, my emphasis. This article is subsequently referred to as Response to Veatch.) But he doesn't explain this, and in Reply to... (shrink)

This paper shows how, according to st. thomas aquinas, basic descriptive moral principles can be both substantive and necessarily true. aquinas's position on reference (the function of the subject term) is similar to that of the contemporary logician, saul kripke, who argues for necessary informative propositions. such propositions in aquinas (which are analyzed in detail in the paper) include definitions-e.g., "human beings, or men, are rational animals"-and property statements. the latter encompass those concerned with natural inclinations. from this foundation the (...) necessity of fundamental moral principles is explained. still, moral principles can be refined as we discover more about human nature; "if" true, such statements will be necessarily true. the paper ends with an explanation of how basic moral principles can be considered to be not simply "per se", but also "per se nota". (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:530 BOOK REVIEWS Reason and Right. By GARTH HALLETT. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984. Pp. x + 189. $16.95 cloth; $8.95 paperback. Teacher's Guide $5.00. This book is clearly intended to be used as a textbook in introductory ethics courses. This fact almost certainly accounts for four of its most attractive features: its area of focus, its lucid structure and exposition, its relative brevity, and (...) its large number of discussions of current moral issues. Professor Hallett contends that an introductory course in moral philosophy should do three main things: discuss specific moral problems, arquaint with background theory, and train in moral reasoning. The last equips students to deal maturely with problems they will encounter throughout life. Yet this area is neglected, if not omitted, in most ethics text books. Hence the focus of Reason ancl Right. Other topics are approached through their relation to such reasoning. For example, Professor Hallett uses the case of Kitty Genovese (who was murdered while thirtyeight witnesses remained passive) to arrive at a discussion of the nature of moral reasoning, as distinguished from "thoughts" and reasoning in general. In this context he injects a treatment of areas that might be thought to belong to background theory: psychological egoism, ethical egoism, psychological altruism, ethical altruism. Before commenting further on the book's method of exposition, I should like to mention another consideration which, although not examined at length by the author, brackets his entire discussion and is not without implications for ethical questions passed over in this work. Early on, Professor Hallett suggests that one reason for teaching moral philosophy is to encourage in students a concern for moral issues. Using the Genovese case, he says: Doubtless we too might be more open than we are, more perceptive of others and their needs, more alive to the appeals, muted or screamed, that reach us, more or less frequently, more or less clearly, according as we are tuned to receive them. That is one function of an ethics course. Through examples and discussion it jogs the moral imagination (p. 7). The author ties the desire to aet ethically with his discussion of moral reasoning by noting that rationalization is often inferior reasoning insofar as the merely self-coneerned agent may deliberately ignore pertinent facts. On the other hand, one who genuinely wants solutions to ethical problems will seek to reason well, which requires practice in identifying effective reasoning. In a " Retrospect " redolent of these points, Professor Hallett explicitly raises the Socratic question of the relation between knowledge BOOK REVIEWS 531 and living well. He ends with an invitation to examine this issue, suggesting its importance for the course as a whole. Indeed, without demeaning the motives of students, the ethics professor who concurs with the classical attitude toward the goal of the study of moral philosophy must take seriously this role of jogging the moral impulse. As St. Aquinas (who held that despite original sin the human orientation toward acting morally well remains intact) recognized, genuinely moral action requires free choice, and systematically morally good behavior must be preceded by commitment. Clever is Professor Hallett's approach to exposing logical shortcoming (in arguments proffered for a variety of reasons) that may result from the lack of such commitment. Who wants to admit being deliberately defective in logic? At least such a consideration may jog one to reflect upon the humanly deficient state of one generally unconcerned about ethics. The subject of moral motivation provides a bridge to the more theoretical debate, not taken up in this book, about the nature of value-judgments. If descriptive, they can be true or false. If prescriptive, they are inherently action-guiding but are not statements of fact, and hence not true or false. Prescriptivists emphasize the logical impossibility of one's adhering to a value-judgment while not acting according to it in the relevant circumstances. For all value-judgments are said to be both prescriptive and universalizable; an attempt to exclude oneself from an apparently embraced universal directive, provided one is physically and psychologically capable of acting according to it, reveals insincerity. Sin, then, becomes impossible. Much has been said about this... (shrink)